The Infantry - Organisation & Tactics
Hungarian regiments were not included in this scheme, there being no conscrip-
tion in Hungary. The garrison regiments were not calculated as part of the field army, being composed of semi-
'invalid' soldiers, used only for garrison duty.
In addition to changes of Inhaber and thus title, circumstances occasioned more fundamental changes. For example, the 1798 - 99 reforms removed the Grenz regiments from the numbered sequence, vacating numbers 60 to 76, new regiments (60 to 62) being formed from the 4th battalions of Hungarian regiments. Loss of recruiting-grounds enforced other changes; thus the Italian regiment numbered 48, originally recruited around Mantua, became Hungarian; and though the six Walloon regiments retained that designation, they were henceforth recruited in Bohemia.
There is little space here to mention the internal politics which beset the higher command (much to the detriment of the army), or to cover in detail the organisational reforms which usually followed a serious reverse; there exists an excellent modern study of these aspects in English by: Rothenberg, to which the reader is recommended *(See My Bibliography Section). beside the proposal of many sensible reforms, reaction at the highest level usually prevented the complete overhaul which was needed: as Feldmarschall-Leutnant Radetsky wrote, every defeat was followed by: "a great outcry for army reform", and an "even greater desire not to spend the necessary funds!" The Archduke Charles, the Emperor's brother and Austria's best commander (though periodically out of favour), is usually regarded the army's greatest reformer, though even he was bound by expediency and convention.
Hasty reforms were pushed through in 1805, so soon before the army embarked on campaign that they caused only confusion (Archduke Charles realised the danger, and apparently never applied the new regulations for his own forces). The main change was for each infantry regiment to be arranged in one grenadier and four fusilier battalions, each battalion being of four companies of a nominal 160 men each. In the words of one officer, all this achieved was that 'common soldiers no longer knew their officers and the officers did not know their men'. The 1907 regulations, supervised by the Archduke Charles, returned to the previous organisation (three battalions and two grenadier companies per regiment, field battalions of six companies and garrison battalions of four), wartime establishment now being the same as peacetime save for the augmentation of the third battalion to six companies and the detachment of the grenadiers to composite battalions; German regiments were to have 180 men per company and Hungarian 200, though few were ever actually at full strength.
After the defeat of 1809, loss of recruitinggrounds resulted in the disbanding of the 13th, 23rd, 38th, 43rd, 45th, 46th, 50th and 55th regiments, and strictures placed upon the strength of the army by treaty reduced all third battalions to cadres, with the strength of German companies reduced to about 60 rank and file, and of Hungarian companies to 100.
(Left:) Company and field officers of german infantry, 1798. Note; the field officer's cuff lace, and the pistol holster slung behind the company officer's body on a cross strap.
(Centre:) German officer in undress uniform, 1798, wearing the Oberrock and bicorn; the sash is not worn with this order of dress, so the sword belt is revealed.
(Right:) Hungarian infantry, 1800, wearing a mixture of styles __ two men wear the 1798 helmet, and one (right) a peaked version of the old Casquet. Note how small the new 'knapsack' is depicted here. The right-hand man wears a sabre, and appears to have a plate on his cartridge box.
From 1811, regimental fourth battalions were to be provided by the Landwher. Attempts to increase the calibre of the officers had limited effects, due largely to the Inhaber system, which was open to nepotism; and purchase of commissions was still permitted. Archduke Charles attempted to overhaul the system of recruiting, but instead of broadening the conscription laws (which exempted all but the lowest classes), he merely tried to make military service less objectionable by reducing the enlistment term in 1802 to ten years for the infantry, the previous lifetime service having produced (in 'Charles' view) only decrepit or dissaffected men. An objection to this abortive plan for eight-year service was the ever-present fear that trained soldiers might provide leadership for insurrection should they be discharged early!
Training was inconsistent; whereas the regulars were well-disciplined, numbers of untrained men were often present in units enlarged to wartime establishment, and the usual parsimony hindered practice. For example, in 1805 Archduke Ferdinand reported, "Since many of the newly-arrived troops have still to be trained in musketry, I approve the issue of six live rounds to be fired by every such man"! Though an isolated case, the evidence of an exercise before the Emperor at Minkendorf, in which cavalry and grenadiers actually began to fight each other, leaving 3 dead and 60 wounded, does not reflect well either upon the central command nor upon methods of training!
Discipline was enforced rigidly, though Archduke Charles endeavoured in 1807 to humanise the system and to discourage physical beatings: "Love of his Monarch and an honest life...obedience, loyalty, resolution, these are the soldiers virtues. In one word, a soldier must be a nobleman". As national pride in a multi-national army was difficult to attain, the soldier's pride was chaneleld towards the esprit de corps of his regiment, sometimes with bad results: as the British observer Sir Thomas Graham described, in 1796 an Austrian regiment suffered 150 casualties to French skirmishers at Borghetto, when a withdrawal of six yards would have sheltered them. As Graham noted, only the "stupid bravado" of maintaining the regiment's honour compelled them to stand in the open. Forward-looking though Archduke Charles was, however, even his 'reforms' could be eccentric; for example after Wagram (at which battle the troops had done all that could have been expected) a principal objection was to the noise they made: "shouting was so general that the commanders could not be heard", and thus Charles therefore instructed that henceforth regiments were to keep quiet, or be disbanded and their officers cashiered! In some ways, the ordinary soldiers throughout shouldered the blame for the failing of those in higher authority __ a situation hardly peculiar to this army or this period.
