The Infantry - Organisation & Tactics
Charles believed that the three-deep deep line could even charge cavalry, ceasing fire within 50 yards and then pressing on with the bayonette __ a questionable tactic, leading to some rash attacks in 1809. For manoeuvre, a 'battalion column' was preferred, formed from line on the right flank company, a considerably slower process than the French method of changing formation.
Best known in the 1807 innovations was the 'mass', a closely packed variant of the traditional square, which Charles considered too fragile and incapable of manoeuvre. Originating in wars against the Turks, the mass was a tight column with a depth ideally not exceeding double its width. The 'division mass', two companieswide, was not popular and was used less than the 'battalion mass', one company wide and six ranks deep, used frequently in 1809 and later.
Left: Hungarian infantry, 1806 uniform, in a print after Weigl. The NCO at the right seems to wear a short Oberrock and a cavalry style style pouch with an eagle plate. The Grenzer at the left holds either an old lance, or a "Crespi" breach loader with its spear bayonette fixed.
Though vulnerable to artillery, they were useful for manoeuvre in 'open order'; and in 'close order' (files touching the knapsacks of the men in front) could withstand cavalry like a square, though when the men were pressed together into a solid block to resist cavalry there was a danger of those in the middle being crushed.
Though the 1807 manual made provision for a battalions' third rank to be deployed in a skirmish line (up to one-third of a company), skirmishers were never allowed the flexibility of their French counterparts, either because the Austrians were over-drilled (as some claimed), or because the Austrian hierarchy never appreciated the value of skirmishers. Even when deployed they were given little scope for individualism, with the emphasis being on defence, and they were tightly controlled by the battalion drums. Normally a skirmish line (six paces between men) would be deployed within 300 paces of the main body, only two platoons actually in the skirmish line, with two formed platoons in reserve 100 paces back, and two more platoons in further reserve another 100 paces away. Redetzky claimed that skirmishing was limited because: "we do not understand this kind of fighting", and, unlike the previous century, little attempt was made to revert the Grenzers to the light infantry role to which they were ideally suited. Even the Jagers were constricted by the traditional Austrian system.
Right: An interesting opportunity to compare a contemporary naif and a later and expert reconstruction: Left: A German grenadier in a print published in 1808 by Tranquillo Mollo; Right: Ottenfeld's rendering of a German grenadier in about 1814, published at the end of the century. Note* the grenadier badge replacing the matchcase on the crossbelt; and the rectangular pattern canteen.
The enlargement of the army in 1813 only exacerbated the situation, as less than a third of the troops were considered fully trained, the balance (according to Redetzky) being 'peasants in uniform'. With troops unable to perform the 1807 manoeuvres, simpler tactics were adopted, making column attack and not the firepower of the line the basic element.
